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Filmmaking, Logic and the 
Historical Reconstruction of the World 
 
 
… Identity is the very Devil and immensely important; very much more so than I 
thought. It hangs – like everything else – directly together with the most 
fundamental questions, especially with the questions concerning the occurrence 
of the same argument in different places of a function. I have all sorts of ideas 
for a solution of the problem but could not yet arrive at anything definite. 
However, I don't lose courage and go on thinking. 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1913)1 
 
[Speaking of negation]. The question here is: Is the positive fact primary, and 
the negative secondary, or are they on the same level? And if so, how is it with 
the facts p v q, p only if q, etc.? Aren't these on the same level as –p? But then 
must not all facts be on the same level? The question is really this: Are there 
facts besides the positive ones? (For it is difficult not to confuse what is not the 
case with what is the case instead of it.) … 
 
It is the dualism, positive and negative facts, that gives me no peace. For such a 
dualism can't exist. But how are we to get away from it? 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1914)2 
 
No other medium of expression has the cinema's original and innate capacity for 
showing things, that we believe worth showing, as they happen day by day … . 
 
Cesare Zavattini3 
 
 
Twenty-five hundred years ago, as the arts of our civilisation dawned in Attica, 
Parmenides warned his followers to avoid negation, for they would otherwise find the 
                                                     
1 From a letter to Bertrand Russell, written in Norway on 29 October 1913, reproduced 
in part in Appendix III of Notebooks 1914–1916, edited by G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. 
Anscombe (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1969), page 122.  
2 From a set of remarks entered into a notebook on 25 November 1914, translated into 
English by G. E. M. Anscombe and reproduced on pages 33/33e of Notebooks 1914-1916 [see 
footnote 1].  
3 Cesare Zavattini, Sequences from a Cinematic Life, translated and introduced by 
William Weaver (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1970 [original Italian 
edition, 1967]), page 220. 
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identity of the world incomprehensible and be tempted to deny it.4 Parmenides' caution 
went unheeded. The logic by which philosophers from Aristotle through Frege to Quine 
have tried to render the world coherent has rested resolutely, despite occasional 
dissenters, upon a notion of negation presumed to be intelligible. The presumption, as 
Parmenides forewarned, has rendered unintelligible the identity of the world.  
 
In 1971 Stanley Cavell protested against the common disavowal of the 'mysterious' 
identities entailed by photographs and films, echoing in the deafening silence the 
sentiments of André Bazin, Erwin Panofsky and, unwittingly, Siegfried Kracauer.5 In 1975 
Sol Worth, upset by the semiotic sludge obstructing anthropologists trying to make 
films, suggested specifically that filmmaking must be an endeavour unlike language as 
commonly construed, for the expression of negation is cinematically impossible.6 And by 
1985 it had become obvious, at least to Nelson Goodman, the most cautious yet 
audacious of philosophers, that the uniqueness and hence identity of the world had 
been rendered unintelligible: there must be, negation presumed, as many worlds as 
right world-descriptions.7 
 
Cavell and Worth were ignored, trivialized or swept aside by the political tides of 
semiotics. Goodman, having friends in high places, was, as usual, bypassed in reverent 
disbelief. Goodman, however, in company with the giants of philosophy from Plato 
through Kant to Wittgenstein, who began by pondering the perplexities of the exact 
sciences only to end in art, went beyond them to suggest and rightly, as we shall see,  
                                                     
4 See S. Wheeler, "Megarian Paradoxes as Eleatic Arguments", American Philosophical 
Quarterly 20 (1983), pp. 287-95. I am indebted to Laurence R. Horn's A Natural History of 
Negation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), page 50, for this reference and for the 
quotation from Russell in footnote 20. Horn's remarkable book has been a constant companion 
and provocation during the writing of this essay. 
5 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (New York: 
Viking Press, 1971), especially chapter 2, 'Sights and Sounds.' "It may be felt that I make too 
great a mystery of these objects [films and photographs]. My feeling is rather that we have 
forgotten how mysterious these things are, and in general how different things are from one 
another, as though we had forgotten how to value them. This is in fact something movies teach 
us." This little book has influenced me beyond measure for a quarter-century, augmented by 
Cavell's later reflections on related matters. 
6 Sol Worth, "Pictures Can't Say Aint", Versus 12 (1975), pages 85-108. Reprinted in Tony 
Thomas and Rudy Behlmer, Hollywood's Hollywood (New York: Citadel Press, 1975).  
7 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1978), especially chapters 1, 6 and 7. I shall hereafter refer to this book as Goodman, WWM. 
Goodman is here clarifying and expanding conclusions expressed in 1960 in "The Way the World 
Is", Review of Metaphysics 14 (1960), pages 48-56, upon which Richard Rorty later capitalized in 
"The World Well Lost", Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972), pages 649-65. 
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that the making of works of art, those events that most freely exemplify worlds, must be 
the model for worldmaking in general.8 We learn at our best to make worlds artistically, 
and hence, although Goodman never says so, learning to identify works of art must be 
the model for learning to identify in general. 
 
I wish in this essay to return to Parmenides by making a world, in Goodman's sense, so 
absurd and wondrous that readers may at first glance fail to recognize it as a world 
remade, again in Goodman's sense - a reconstruction of the logical world whose 
incoherence we have been trained to disregard. In a style learned from Quine, 
Goodman and Davidson, but austerely redirected, I shall sketch a world in which all 
things may be identified and yet distinguished, in which falsity and negation are 
unintelligible, in which truth is ubiquitous and non-discriminatory and in which the 
crafty arts like filmmaking are the models for scientific, philosophical and logical 
construction. I shall introduce the world historically, and, after Collingwood and Kuhn, 
accept its historicity as part of the logical lesson to be learned. And I shall conclude, with 
Parmenides, that it is the only world available to us. 
 
To those unaccustomed to traversing the wintry wilderness in which my kind of 
pragmatism flourishes, I may appear to be skiing across a pond vast and deep, oblivious 
to the creaking of stressed ice beneath the snow. If so, I should remind you that one 
may travel more securely within my pristine logical landscape than in more populated 
vistas to the south, if only one knows and respects the ice, checks one's equipment 
before departing and travels light. Should you choose to follow, and fall through the ice, 
chances are good the logical baggage you are carrying is excessive. 
 
 
Lumière's Identities9 
 
In 1895 Louis Lumière stood on a quay in the railway station at La Ciotat in southern 
France awaiting the arrival of a train. Beside him stood a curious machine that he had 
constructed, one of the first motion picture cameras. As the train pulled into the station, 
Lumière aimed his camera and turned the crank. The train rolled to a stop and the 
                                                     
8 "Rather than attempting to subsume descriptive and representational rightness under 
truth, we shall do better, I think, to subsume truth along with these under the general notion of 
rightness of fit." (Goodman, WWM, page 132) Goodman is here amplifying "Art and the 
Understanding", the concluding section of his Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1976), pages 262-65. 
9 A preliminary assessment of the situations described in this section and the next 
appeared in my essay "Kant's Station; the Lumières' Train: Seeing Things by Means of Film", 
Canadian Journal of Film Studies 1, No. 1 (1990), pages 36-56. A comparison of the film-theoretic 
context of that discussion to the more radical assessment given here may be of interest. 
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passengers disembarked, walking past the camera on their way into the depot. Finally, 
having exhausted his reel of film, Lumière stopped cranking the camera.  
 
Several months later, on 28 December 1895, thirty-five persons gathered in the Salon 
Indien in the basement of the Grand Café on the Boulevard des Capucines in Paris 
having purchased tickets to the first paid public screenings in a 'cinema'. During the 
evening a roll of film printed from the strip exposed at the train station was placed 
inside the machine now converted into a projector. The lights were dimmed, the 
projector's lamp was lit, the spectators gazed at a screen hung at the end of the room 
and the projectionist began to crank the projector. 
 
What did Louis Lumière see as he peered in the ensuing moments at the screen in the 
darkened room? More precisely, what kinds of events did he encounter visually as he 
focused his eyes upon the illuminated screen hanging before him?10 
 
Unlike some in the audience, Lumière knew exactly what he was seeing. He knew, on 
the one hand, that he was focusing upon a screen whose surface was being variably 
illuminated by the intermittent light impinging upon it from the projector. He was 
therefore encountering an object in the room before him, the surface of the screen, 
under conditions of cinematic illumination. On the other hand, he knew that he was also 
encountering, and by the same act of seeing, an event distinguishable from the former, 
for he was seeing, as well, a train pulling into a station and passengers disembarking 
onto a quay and exiting - the same train, station, passengers, quay and event that he 
had encountered some months before while filming them. 
 
Lumière, thankfully, was untrained as a logician and prepared to act without question or 
quibble upon the remarkable identifications and distinctions he was unwittingly making. 
It was obvious to him that: 
 
(a) he was encountering the surface of the screen in the room before him 
under conditions of cinematic illumination, the only event occurring in the room 
to be encountered; and yet 
 
                                                     
10 Throughout this essay I shall use the word 'encounter' as equivalent to Kant's 
'Anschauung', a noun usually translated into English, with appropriate misgivings, as 'intuition'. 
The comprehension of Kant by students, and by many scholars as well, would be significantly 
advanced were the word 'intuition' to be banned from all translations, and the word 'encounter' 
put in its place. 
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(b) he was encountering, by the same act of seeing, an event occurring 
elsewhere than in the room before him, an event distinguishable therefore from 
the former; 
 
(c) he could identify event (b) with an event that he had encountered in 
another place some months earlier; hence 
 
(d) he could both distinguish and identify events (a), (b) and (c). 
 
Put another way, Lumière presupposed that he could both distinguish and identify the 
events he encountered to whatever degree might prove useful. But that suggests that 
ascriptions of identity are relative. 
 
I shall presume without argument, however absurd it may seem, that Lumière (and 
thereafter every working filmmaker, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding) was 
correct in the identifications and distinctions that he made. Simply by being born and 
raised within a world of trains, passengers, quays and cameras, Lumière had trained 
himself to discriminate and identify rightly what he was seeing by means of films. To 
claim otherwise is to misunderstand filmmaking and therewith the mysteries of identity 
that philosophy and its logic must accommodate. 
 
Consequently, I shall argue that there must be less to logic than we are accustomed to 
pretending. Logic, like filmmaking and every other art, is a constructive rather than 
critical endeavour, and we who would think precisely must learn to avoid begging the 
questions that have made it seem more than it is. To understand how this must be, 
however, we must, as Robin Collingwood insisted, comprehend it historically. I begin my 
historical reconstruction, however, with a blunt commentary on identity itself. 
 
 
Identity and Negative Inference 
 
On the desk before me lies a pen. It weighs 5 grams, is black with silver trim and might 
break if dropped. On my desk, as well, sits a book. The book weighs 500 grams, has a red 
cover and could well survive a casual fall. 
 
I wish now to ask a question so peculiar that I know of no comparable query in the 
entire history of philosophy, namely, is the pen identical to the book?11 I, of course, 
                                                     
11 By 'A is identical to B' I mean what Leibniz would have meant, namely, that were one 
to speak truly of A, one would thereby speak truly of B, and conversely. The claim being 
pondered here is whether the pen and the book are one and the same object, a query distinct 
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believe the pen and the book to be distinct and have no reason whatever to believe 
them identical. But what if someone were to claim they were identical? What 
counterevidence could we bring against the claim? 
 
Suppose someone were to enter my room and, in the course of conversation, express 
admiration for the book, suggesting that she had long sought a hardcover edition like 
my own. I, having another copy, offer to sell it to her. She writes me a check, thanks me 
profusely, picks up the book and my pen and prepares to exit the room. When I, 
dumbfounded, ask what she is doing with my pen, she, equally dumbfounded, replies 
that she just bought it.12 What evidence could I now bring against her claim? If I were to 
say to her, for example, "But the pen weighs 5 grams while the book weighs 500 grams", 
she would reply, "True enough, it weighs both 5 grams and 500 grams." Were I to retort, 
"But surely an object cannot weigh both 5 grams and 500 grams!", she would simply 
point to the pen/book (whichever, or both, from my viewpoint) and say, "But there's a 
counterexample!" 
 
Note my dilemma! Whenever I attempt to point out a difference between the pen and 
the book, she accepts the distinction but construes it adverbially rather than 
adjectivally, retaining the identity to which she is accustomed. Every time I propose an 
empirical test, she agrees to the test (for example, the pen/book weighs 5 grams and 
500 grams, but apparently not 350), but then attributes the bifurcation to a difference in 
measuring technique rather than substance. (In one case we are measuring the object 
"in a pen-like way", in the other "in a book-like way"; the former yields 5 grams, the 
latter 500.)  
 
Put another way, whenever I suggest that some predicate, relational or otherwise, is 
testably true of either the pen or the book, she agrees with me. Whenever I go on to 
suggest, however, that the predicate entails the negation of some other predicate, she 
refuses to accept the entailment, pointing out that I am thereby obviously begging the 
question of the identity of the pen and the book. Since the world of objects I encounter 
appears to her exactly as it does to me, I am prohibited from bringing counterevidence 
                                                     
from the triviality of asking whether we may imagine a compound object consisting of the pen 
and the book as parts. Many philosophers, having presumed a pair of objects to be distinct, have 
inquired into the necessary and sufficient conditions of their individuation. No philosopher, to 
my knowledge, has ever enquired of objects presumed to be distinct whether they might be 
identical. 
12 Whatever reasons, if any, she might have for believing the pen and the book to be 
identical are irrelevant here. Imagine simply that she has her reasons, and remember that, prior 
to the advent of quantum theory, no one had any reason either to believe that a nuclear particle 
could be in two places at once, though that is now a compelling explanation for most variants of 
the classical two-slit experiment. 
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against her identity claim without, from her perspective, begging the question. Yet she 
obviously construes my world differently, for her reconstrual makes a difference: if 
uncountered, I should soon have fewer pens in my possession.13 
 
Clearly, I am trapped with no escape. But then, generalizing, it follows that the 
presumptions that we have become accustomed to making about the logic of identity 
must be mistaken. I and everyone else encounter the objects of the world through 
engendered habits of identifying and distinguishing that resist emendation. They are, in 
Collingwood's words, the absolute presuppositions upon which further enquiry rests.14 If 
I am to learn from the conversations of others, however, and to do so without prejudice, 
I must refrain from begging the question of whatever contrary identity claims they may 
presuppose. But then I must avoid altogether drawing negative inferences. 
 
Readers familiar with the history of mathematical thought during the first half of the 
20th century will by now have sensed a resonance, for I am hardly the first to have 
suggested that our inferences must be restricted with respect to negation if we are to 
think carefully. A similar claim lay at the heart of the intuitionist attack on the formalist 
program in metamathematics, a campaign that failed, I shall suggest, from timidity 
rather than arrogance, for the very notion of negation itself, rather than negative 
inferences alone, must be avoided. But let's move step by step. 
 
 
Wittgenstein, Popper and Contradiction 
 
In 1928 Ludwig Wittgenstein attended a lecture in Vienna by the eminent topologist 
Luitzen Brouwer, the most distinguished proponent of intuitionism, an encounter that 
prompted Wittgenstein's return to philosophy and his engagement with the enquiries 
that resulted, a quarter-century later, in the publication of Philosophical 
Investigations.15 Wittgenstein had intended to include within the book a series of 
remarks on the foundations of mathematics. Dissatisfied, however, he chose to exclude 
                                                     
13 Note the crucial difference between my adversary asserting her identity claim, come 
what may, and maintaining a testable assertion in the face of contrary evidence. Were she guilty 
of the latter, she would have to deny some testable assertion that I accept, or presume some 
assertion that I deny. Here, however, we agree on every testable assertion. Her claim, therefore, 
unlike the evasions of a conventionalist, is as methodologically sound as my own. 
14 See Part I of Robin Collingwood's An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1940), pages 3-77. 
15 See Raymond Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1990), pages 249-51. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations was published in Oxford 
by Basil Blackwell in 1953 with a translation by Elizabeth Anscombe.  
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them from the publication,16 and quite rightly so, for they encompassed suggestions of 
such startling absurdity that only an account of unprecedented perspicacity could have 
rendered them ponderable, much less palatable, to readers. 
 
Scattered throughout the remarks, for example, were comments that seemed to imply 
that contradictions found within proofs were either unintelligible or innocuous, and 
hence the search for consistency in mathematics was misguided.17 Exactly what 
Wittgenstein had in mind is controversial. We may garner a fairly clear notion of what 
was troubling him, however, by imagining how he might have responded to, say, 
Popper's demonstration of comparable vintage of the presumption among logicians that 
from a contradiction one may infer any assertion whatsoever, "one of the few facts of 
elementary logic", Popper assures us, "which are not quite trivial and deserve to be 
known and understood by every thinking man".18 Popper's argument is as good as any 
and better than most, for it is characteristically clear. If, upon examination, it should 
prove unintelligible, then little hope of sense remains for any other. 
 
Suppose, Popper says, that we have within a proof derived a contradiction, a sentence 
of the form '(p and –p)' implying, by definition, that both of its conjuncts are true. From 
the first of the conjuncts we may infer 'p or q', where 'q' stands in place of any assertion 
whatsoever, for, as a quick check by truth-table will attest, there is a valid rule (Rule 1) 
licensing the inference: the material conditional 'p only if (p or q)' could be false only if 
the antecedent is true and the consequent false; but if 'p' is true, so is '(p or q)', hence 
the conditional is true. From '(p or q)' and the second conjunct '–p', however, we may 
deduce 'q' itself, for there is another valid rule (Rule 2) licensing this inference as well: 
the material conditional '((p or q) and –p) only if q' could be false only if the antecedent 
were true while 'q' were false; but if 'q' is false, then '((p or q) and –p)' is false regardless 
of whether 'p' is true or 'p' is false (that is, '–p' is true). 
  
From a contradiction, Popper concludes, we may infer any assertion whatsoever. 
Contradictions must therefore be avoided, for they render proofs incapable of 
discrimination. 
 
                                                     
16 See the Editor's Preface to Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), pages vi-vii. Hereafter Wittgenstein, RFM. 
17 See, for example, Appendix I to Part I of Wittgenstein, RFM, sections 11-18; Part II, 77-
78; Part III, 55-60; and Part V, 8-13, 21-22, 27-30. The concluding reflection of section 17, 
Appendix I to Part I, is typical: "(The superstitious fear and awe of mathematicians in face of 
contradiction.)" 
18 Karl Popper, "What is Dialectic?", Mind (New Series) 49 (1940); reprinted as chapter 
15 of Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1969 [1963]), 
page 317. 
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What's wrong with Popper's argument? Imagine what Wittgenstein might have said in 
response to it. Consider the contradiction '(p and –p)' with which it begins. Either the 
sentence is unintelligible or we must understand what it means as an assertion within 
the proof. If it is unintelligible, then nothing can follow from it, for we can deduce 
nothing from nonsense. To understand what an assertion means, however, as Donald 
Davidson was later to insist, is to understand its truth conditions – to understand it, that 
is, as if it were true.19 The assertion 'It is raining now', for example, is true if and only if it 
is raining now, but 'It is raining now' then, and only then, means it is raining now. 
 
For Popper's proof to progress, therefore, we must comprehend '(p and –p)' as if it were 
true. But then, when drawing inferences from it, we must only use rules that are valid 
both of worlds within which '(p and –p)' is true and of worlds within which, if 'p' is true, 
then '–p' is false (and conversely). Popper's Rule 1 is valid of such worlds: the 
conditional 'p only if (p or q)' is true whatever the truth-value of 'p', regardless of the 
truth-value of '–p', and hence true of all worlds within which '(p and –p)' is true. 
Popper's Rule 2, however, is invalid of such worlds, for if 'q' is false, then the conditional 
'((p or q) and –p) only if q' is false whenever 'p' and '–p' are true. Rule 2 cannot be used 
to draw valid inferences from '(p and –p)', for it relies essentially on the notion of 
negation, and any rule that does so cannot validly be applied to '(p and –p)'.20 
 
To Wittgenstein, therefore, Popper's proof collapses into incoherence. Popper has 
admitted into it a sentence '(p and –p)' that could be meaningful only within a world in 
which both 'p' and '–p' were true, and yet has used a rule of inference (Rule 2) valid only 
of worlds prohibiting their joint truth. He has, in effect, presumed the consistency of 
every possible world in demonstrating the validity of his rules of inference, while 
permitting those rules to be applied to a description meaningful only of an inconsistent 
world. Either the contradiction is meaningless, or Popper's second rule (and  other rules 
like it) must be inapplicable to it. Properly understood, therefore, contradictions are 
innocuous: if unintelligible, they are useless; if intelligible, they immunize themselves. 
                                                     
19 See the papers reprinted as essays 1-5 in Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Hereafter Davidson, ITI. 
20 Within the propositional calculus, a negative inference, roughly put, is any well-
formed formula that is or encompasses the negation of a well-formed formula found within its 
premises, and any rule licensing such an inference relies essentially upon negation. A logic 
restricted to rules without negation would include modus ponens but would exclude almost all 
inferences classically licensed by truth-functional equivalencies (e.g. De Morgan's transform-
ations, the inference from '(p only if q)' to '(–p or q)', or from 'p' to '–(–p)' and conversely). In 
quantification theory, the customary conversion of the quantifiers would be prohibited.  The 
laws of Excluded Middle and Contradiction would be retained but, deprived of nonconstructive 
power, would be uninteresting. 
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Wittgenstein's counterthrust cuts deeply, for it implies that Popper's argument, and 
every other resting upon negative inferences, begs the question of consistency. Since 
we cannot know the consistency of any set of premises complex enough to be of 
mathematical interest, we must avoid rules of inference that presuppose it. We must 
therefore avoid rules of inference that rely essentially on negation, reaffirming exactly 
the conclusion that we drew earlier from our consideration of identity claims. 
 
 
The Unintelligibility of Negation 
 
Wittgenstein remained dissatisfied with his remarks on mathematics and rightly so, for 
he wished on the one hand to draw the poison from contradictions found within proofs, 
while retaining on the other hand the full force of logical incompatibility (for example, 
that a surface cannot logically be at once both red and green). He was too good a 
logician, fortunately, unlike some of his followers, to pretend that he had rendered the 
incoherence innocuous. 
 
Earlier, the intuitionists had encountered a similar though inverse incoherence. Unable 
to conceive of a completed infinite, they tried to block proofs engendering it by 
redefining negation to exclude the Law of Excluded Middle, the principle that licenses 
the placing into proofs of assertions of the form ('p or –p'), for every one of the classical 
proofs about the completed infinite depends upon it. Unfortunately, the intuitionists 
wished at the same time to retain the Law of Contradiction, the principle licensing the 
placing into proofs of assertions of the form '– (p and – p)'. Although Arend Heyting 
showed in 1930 that one could formally redefine negation to that end, most 
mathematicians, including many otherwise sympathetic to the program of avoiding 
completed infinities, sensed incoherence. One need, after all, only understand the 
notions of asserting, negating and conjoining to comprehend the latter law, but they in 
turn suffice to define alternation (in its classical sense) and hence, it would seem, to 
render the former law as intelligible as the latter.21 
                                                     
21 Arend Heyting, "Die formlen Regeln der intuitionistischen Logic", Sitzungsberichte der 
Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Physikalisch-mathematische Klasse (1930), pages 
42-56; and in the same publication, "Die formalen Regeln der intuitionistischen Mathematik", 
pages 57-71 and 158-69. Unsurprisingly, Kurt Gödel's demonstration in 1932 that Heyting's 
calculus could be reinterpreted "in terms of the concepts of the usual sentential logic and of the 
concept 'p is provable'" was read by most mathematicians as having given sense to a system 
previously unintelligible. See Gödel's "Zum intuitionistischen Aussagenkalkül", Akademie der 
Wissenschaften in Wien, Mathematisch-naturwissenschaftliche Klasse, Anzeiger 69 (1932); 
reprinted in Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums 4 (Vienna: Verlag Franz Deuticke, 
1933), pages 39-40; reprinted under the title "An Interpretation of the Intuitionistic Sentential 
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Wittgenstein and the intuitionists courted incoherence, for they wished to exclude 
negation from inferences while retaining it within assertions. But negation is 
unintelligible within assertions as well, and the proof is transparent.  
 
As Alfred Tarski insisted in 1933, the notion of truth is intelligible for a language only if 
we can derive from it the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of every 
assertion within the language.22 To express the truth conditions of any assertion within 
a language, however, we need know only how to mention and to use it, for we need 
only mention the assertion on the left side of a biconditional, and use it (or a translation 
of it) on the right side, to express its truth conditions. 'It is raining now', for example, is 
true if and only if it is raining now. To understand its truth conditions is therefore to 
understand what it means, for 'It is raining now' means that it is raining now. The 
conditions of truth and intelligibility thus coincide for assertions, as noted above. 
 
Unfortunately, we can give neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the negation 
of an assertion, and hence the notion of negation is unintelligible. The negation of an 
assertion would, if intelligible, be true by definition if and only if the assertion itself 
were false. The intelligibility of negation hinges therefore on the intelligibility of falsity. 
There is a radical asymmetry, however, between the intelligibility of the notion of truth 
and that of falsity, for whereas conditions can be expressed for the truth of any 
assertion, none can be given for its falsity: the corresponding biconditional (e.g. 'It is 
raining now' is false if and only if ... ') is incomplete. Since we are unable to express 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an assertion to be false, the notion of falsity is 
unintelligible. But then negation is unintelligible as well. If we are to think precisely, 
therefore, we must avoid the notions of falsity and negation altogether. 
 
No wonder negation has proven so useless in the everyday world, as so many 
philosophers in our century have remarked in amazement.23 When the engine of 
                                                     
Logic", translated by J. Hintikka and L. Rossi, in The Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Jaakko 
Hintikka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pages 128-29. Heyting's Intuitionism: An 
Introduction (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1956) remains to this day the best introduction to the 
subject in English. 
22 Alfred Tarski, "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen", translated from 
the Polish by L. Blaustein, Studia philosophica 1 (1936; submitted 1933), pages 261-405, 
reprinted in translation by J. H. Woodger as "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages", in 
Tarski's Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1956), pages 152-278. 
23 See, for example, Bertrand Russell's affirmation of 1948 that "the world can be 
described without the use of the word 'not'" (Human Knowledge, its Scope and Limits (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), page 520); or Peter Geach's acknowledgment in 1956 of "the 
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language is put to work rather than idling, in Wittgenstein's metaphor, negation 
disappears in the dust. 
 
 
Overhearing Truths 
 
Logic, if unpresumptuous, must be constructive: negation must be avoided in both 
inference and assertion, for the notion of falsity upon which it rests is unintelligible. The 
uses of logic without negation, however, are transparent, for with consistency assured, 
criticism coincides with the hard task of constructing alternatives. With trivial tools, 
however, one may build structures of unlimited complexity,24 as the avoidance of 
negation assuredly confirms, for it voids as well the distinction between truth and falsity 
and therewith the penultimate dogma of empiricism, as Donald Davidson, after Quine, 
almost insisted. 
 
In 1936 a young Willard Quine, bringing the weapons of relativity theory to bear upon 
language, fired a shot across the bow of empiricism to be heard around the world, the 
first salvo of an attack that by 1960 had obliterated the distinction between meaning 
and reference, and hence the pretension that a sentence could be known to be true in 
virtue of its meaning alone: without knowing what a speaker means, reference is 
inscrutable; without knowing to what a speaker refers, meaning, and thus translation, is 
indeterminate.25  
 
The distinction that Quine assailed had appeared in philosophy in many guises and 
under many aliases, among them the analytic/synthetic, necessary/contingent, 
apriori/aposteriori and conventional/empirical. Quine exploded them all, hardly 
                                                     
virtual absence of propositional negation from 'ordinary language'" (from an article on the Law 
of Excluded Middle in Supplementary Volume 30 of the Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 
1956, reprinted in Logic Matters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), page 75.). 
24 This has often been overlooked by critics. As Donald Davidson once remarked in 
exasperation with respect to the theory of truth, "Critics have often made the error of thinking 
that since the theorems that show a theory to be correct are trivial, the theory or the concept of 
truth it characterizes, must also be trivial." (Introduction to Davidson, ITI, page xv) 
25 The crucial works by Quine are "Truth by Convention", in Philosophical Essays for A. N. 
Whitehead, edited by O. H. Lee (New York: Longmans, 1936), pages 90-124, reprinted in Quine's 
The Ways of Paradox, revised and enlarged edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 
pages 77-106; "On What There Is", Review of Metaphysics 2 (1948), pages 21-38, and "Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism", Philosophical Review 60 (1951), pages 20-43, reprinted in From a Logical 
Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pages 1-19 and 20-46 respectively; 
Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960), hereafter Quine, WO; and the collection 
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).  
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however, as the wistful misreadings of Wittgensteinians would suggest, by arguing that 
the notions were useless, but rather by insisting that they must be reconstrued to be of 
only comparative use, giving contrary directions to the same continuum. The assertion 
'White horses are white', for example, is more analytic than (or, if read in the other 
direction, less synthetic than) the assertion 'White horses breathe', but neither is 
analytic (or synthetic), for there is 'no fact of the matter' to which a linguist learning the 
language could appeal to distinguish meaning from reference. Such a linguist, 
overhearing an assertion that seems patently false, must therefore choose either to 
affirm the diagnosis, or to act charitably, presuming the assertion true but beyond his or 
her competence to understand. Quine, on pragmatic grounds, recommended the latter: 
"... assertions startlingly false on the face of it are likely to turn on hidden differences of 
language".26 
 
Quine's insistence upon the primacy of comparative predicates, pragmatic to the core, 
was nearly exhaustive. Monadic predicates, he concluded, were unessential to science 
and hence to a right registering of the world: we need comparative predicates like 'is 
faster than', 'is bigger than' or 'is heavier than' that relate events to one another 
measurably, but can do without 'is fast', 'is big' or 'is heavy'.27 Only one monadic 
predicate escaped relativization: the predicate 'is true' remained for Quine inviolate. It 
never occurred to Quine, therefore, that his arguments could be brought to bear against 
the distinction between truth and falsity itself. 
 
By the 1970s, however, it had dawned upon Donald Davidson that Quine's example of a 
linguist preoccupied by radical translation could be generalized.28 Quine, suspicious of 
all talk of the mental, had focused upon meaning and reference as aspects of the act of 
asserting independent of the intentions and beliefs of the speaker and hearer, and 
hence had presumed a sharp distinction between the objective and the subjective 
aspects of assertion. To overhear an utterance that we find comprehensible enough to 
construe as an assertion, however, even when made by a speaker in our own language, 
is to encounter an expression of a belief held to be true; and since the speaker has found 
it useful to express that belief within our world, its expression, even when calculated to 
mislead us, must be evidence prima facie of its truth. 
                                                     
26 Quine, WO, page 59. Quine's maxim is customarily referred to as 'the Principle of 
Charity', a phrase introduced by Neil Wilson in his article "Substances Without Substrata", 
Review of Metaphysics 12 (1959), pages 521-39 but rendered commonplace through the 
commentaries of Donald Davidson. 
27 The conclusion is a natural consequence of Quine's program. Surprisingly, however, 
the only occasion known to me on which he explicitly said so was in response to a question put 
to him in my presence following an address at York University in February 1991.  
28 See in particular essays 9-12 in the section entitled "Radical Interpretation" in 
Davidson, ITI, pages 123-79.  
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Any encounter with someone making an assertion requires us to interpret what is being 
asserted by attempting to comprehend what beliefs about the world are being 
expressed. But then, contra Quine, we must act charitably: we must attempt almost 
always to interpret the assertions we overhear as expressing true beliefs, for we must 
share with the speaker a massive background of beliefs about the world, almost all of 
which are true, to be able to identify by contrast the occasional misdirection or 
misstatement. Although any of our beliefs may be false, the bulk of them must be true. 
Scepticism, therefore, is statistically impossible.  
 
But if we must assume that almost everything we believe is true, and that almost all of 
our beliefs are shared by every speaker we overhear, then it follows that the world itself 
must be pretty much the way we and everyone else believe it to be.  
 
... the general outlines of our view of the world are correct; we individually and 
communally may go plenty wrong, but only on condition that in most large 
respects we are right. It follows that when we study what our language - any 
language - requires in the way of overall ontology, we are not just making a tour 
of our own picture of things: what we take there to be is pretty much what 
there is.29  
 
The distinction between conceptual scheme and content, a dogma of empiricism 
presumed unwittingly by Quine, is untenable. But then, contra Quine, ontological 
relativity is incoherent as well.30 
 
Davidson's reconstrual of Quine has profound implications for our understanding of how 
we learn, and hence how we should teach others. We are often, and even intentionally, 
misled by assertions we overhear. If Davidson is right, however, we are almost always 
misled by the expression of truths whose irrelevance we misconstrue, rather than 
falsities. Human disputation feeds upon fanaticism rather than falsity, a focusing upon 
too few and disparate truths at the expense of others. If irrationality arises from 
misjudgements about the relative significance of truths rather than misallegiances to 
falsities, then many venerable presumptions about education require revision: the aim 
of instruction must be to stimulate acknowledgment and respect for unrecognized 
truths rather than to eradicate falsities. Critical thinking is idolatry. 
                                                     
29 Davidson, Introduction to ITI, page xviii & xix. The key essay is "On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 
(1974), reprinted as chapter 13 in Davidson, ITI, pages 183-98. 
30 "Our general method of interpretation forestalls the possibility of discovering that 
others have radically different intellectual equipment. ... Without such a dualism, we cannot 
make sense of conceptual relativism." Davidson, Introduction to ITI, page xviii. 
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Davidson, however, never drew the deepest consequence of his argument, for he, like 
Quine, remained enraptured with the notion of truth. We are sometimes, indeed, and 
even intentionally, misled by being told that A is B, only to discover later, perhaps to our 
dismay, that A is C; and we may often have good reason to complain. Our complaint, 
however (and here I step decisively beyond Davidson), can only be that we were led to 
misconstrue the significance of the assertion we overheard. If we have been misled, it is 
because we have inferred, upon hearing that A is B, that A is not C. As noted earlier, 
however, we should have avoided the inference: negative inferences beg the question 
of identity, and nowhere more transparently than here, for the A that is C would be B as 
well to anyone having identified it with anything that is B.31 
 
Davidson, therefore, outdistanced Quine only by rendering untenable the very 
distinction between truth and falsity, the penultimate dogma of empiricism to which 
both he and Quine remained attached. For if, with Davidson, we are obliged to act as if 
almost every belief whose expression we overhear is true, then our task can only be to 
accommodate every belief we hear expressed within the encompassing body of beliefs 
we bring to our encounter, positioning them with respect to their relative significance 
and power. That task would remain the same were we to construe every belief whose 
expression we overhear as true but, in some cases, of vanishingly small significance. But 
then the distinction between truth and falsity has been rendered irrelevant: having 
ascertained rightly the relative insignificance of a belief, the question of its truth or 
falsity evanesces. 
 
Davidson's argument, pushed to its conclusion, renders the notion of truth 
indiscriminate. Our cognitive quests, rather than being 'searches for truth', would more 
aptly be construed as finding a place for novel expressions of belief within the patterns 
of relative significance, value and use we bring to their assessment, a task of coherent 
reconstruction akin to fitting a piece into a puzzle – exactly as Nelson Goodman has 
suggested. 
 
 
Goodman's Worlds 
 
In 1985 Nelson Goodman came as close to hitting the logical nail on the head as any 
philosopher ever has. Truths, Goodman recognized, are almost always irrelevant to the 
discriminations we must make among assertions, hence the 'search for truth' must be 
reconstrued within a broader context of enquiry. Our task, even in science, is to arrange 
                                                     
31 With reference inscrutable and translation indeterminate, as both Quine and 
Davidson insist, negative inferences beg all sorts of other questions as well.  
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assertions in right relationships with one another - a matter of rightness of fit, or useful 
coherence. 
 
... a statement is true, and a description or representation right, for a world it 
fits. ... Rather than attempting to subsume descriptive and representational 
rightness under truth, we shall do better, I think, to subsume truth along with 
these under the general notion of rightness of fit. ... The differences between 
fitting a version to a world, a world to a version, and a version together or to 
other versions fade when the role of versions in making the worlds they fit is 
recognized. And knowing or understanding is seen as ranging beyond the 
acquiring of true beliefs to the discovering and devising of fit of all sorts.32  
 
Learning how to think rightly and thus inquisitively is learning how to construct rather 
than criticize; and since we can only construct something from elements already at hand 
and hence already arranged into a world, it is to learn how to reconstruct a better world 
from a world we encounter rather than seeking the truth about it.33 The arts, therefore, 
are the models for science and philosophy, rather than the reverse, for they encompass 
the reconstructions of the world we most freely undertake. 
 
So far, so good. What then kept Goodman from driving the nail home without 
destroying the uniqueness and identity of our world? Goodman has long believed, and 
correctly, that every word has a unique meaning as does every assertion, and hence, 
with Quine, that quests for meaning and synonymy are useless.34 If then there should be 
incompatible yet equally coherent and encompassing networks of assertions describing 
our world - incompatible right world-descriptions - each would be unique and 
irreducible to any other. 
 
Goodman, unfortunately, assumed without question that negation is intelligible, and 
hence, like Wittgenstein, that a predicate, rightly applied to an object or event from 
within a world-description, excludes others. Convinced, however, that the same subject 
term could occur within distinct world-descriptions, and that incompatible predicates 
within alternative world-descriptions could be rightly appended to the same subject 
term (e.g. the assertions 'The earth moves clockwise' and 'The earth moves 
                                                     
32 Goodman, WWM, pages 132 and 138. 
33 "The many stuffs ... that worlds are made of are made along with the worlds. But 
made from what? Not from nothing, but from other worlds. Worldmaking as we know it always 
starts from worlds already on hand; the making is a remaking." Ibid., page 6. 
34 The central essays are "On Likeness of Meaning", Analysis 10 (1949), pages 1-7, and 
"On Some Differences about Meaning", Analysis 13 (1953), pages 90-96, reprinted in Goodman's 
Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1972), pages 221-30 and 231-38 
respectively.  
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counterclockwise' may be affirmed with equal right, but only within alternative world-
descriptions),35 Goodman concluded that we are encompassed about by incompatible 
right world-descriptions. Since whatever world is described by a right world-description 
can only be accessed by describing it from within that world-description, it follows, 
Goodman concluded, that there must be as many actual worlds as there are right world-
descriptions.36 Misunderstanding the logic of identity, in other words, Goodman 
concluded that the worlds described within right world-descriptions, being 
distinguishable from one another, were therefore prohibited from being identical. 
 
Ever consistent, Goodman made a comparable slip with respect to the identity of works 
of art. One may readily distinguish my dog, for example, from any painting, photograph 
or film that represents her, for one can apply distinct predicates to them. Goodman 
concluded without warrant, however, that I should be mistaken, upon looking at a 
painting, photograph or film of my dog, to identify what I see by doing so with my dog. A 
painting, photograph or film representing my dog, he concluded, must therefore be a 
symbol - an event that refers to my dog within some conventional symbol system that I 
have learned to decipher rather than an object that (re)presents her to me. 
 
... to represent is surely to refer, to stand for, to symbolize. Every 
representational work is a symbol; and art without symbols is restricted to art 
without subject.37 
 
Having slipped twice, Goodman made the best of it. If representation must be 
denotation, and we must have worlds without a world, then the only unity available to 
us must come from above rather than beneath – from an encompassing 'theory of 
symbols'. 
 
So long as contrasting right versions not all reducible to one are countenanced, 
unity is to be sought not in an ambivalent or neutral something beneath these 
versions but in an overall organization embracing them. ... My approach ... is 
                                                     
35 See section 1, "Worlds in Conflict", of chapter 7, "Of Rightness of Rendering", of 
Goodman, WWM, pages 109-16. The example given is from note 4 on page 111. 
36 Ibid., sections 1-3 of chapter 1, pages 1-7. 
37 Ibid., page 58. When it was pointed out to Goodman that he had simply assumed, 
without argument, that "the core of representation is denotation", he could only agree, 
suggesting lamely, after pondering the matter, that by proposing a categorial system that "has 
no truth-value", he was simply showing "what it could do ... what is called for in such cases is 
less like arguing than selling". Ibid., page 129. 
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through an analytic study of types and functions of symbols and symbol 
systems.38 
 
Unfortunately, to construct a theory of symbols encompassing incompatible right world-
descriptions, one must be able to describe from without both the world-descriptions 
and the worlds they describe, for otherwise the semantic relations between description 
and described would remain unspecifiable. As Goodman has insisted, however, one can 
comprehend a world only from within its world-description. To search for an 
encompassing theory of symbols, negation presumed, is therefore fruitless. 
 
Goodman was compelled to deny the identity of our world, and to construe artistic 
representation as symbolic, by a misunderstanding of the logic of identity. Had he 
recognized that we must avoid negation if we are to think with precision, and hence that 
distinction and identity are relative, he assuredly would have recognized that we may 
both distinguish and identify events across the worlds that we construct and hence both 
distinguish and identify the worlds themselves. He would also have recognized that 
works of art may (re)present to us objects, events and worlds that are both 
distinguishable from and yet identifiable with the objects, events and world within 
which we live, move and have our being - as Lumière recognized a century ago.39 Only 
under these conditions could a search for an encompassing theory of symbols be 
successful. But then, of course, the root reason for the search would have disappeared.  
 
                                                     
38 Ibid., page 5. The subtitle of Goodman's Languages of Art is 'An Approach to a Theory 
of Symbols'. 
39 On two occasions, Goodman came very close to asserting the relativity of identity but 
never drew the appropriate conclusion. Early on in WWM he remarks that, "If there is but one 
world, it embraces a multiplicity of contrasting aspects; if there are many worlds, the collection 
of them all is one. The one world may be taken as many, or the many worlds taken as one; 
whether one or many depends on the way of taking. ... all we learn about the world is contained 
in right versions of it; and while the underlying world, bereft of these, need not be denied to 
those who love it, it is perhaps on the whole a world well lost". (Ibid., pages 2 and 4) And when 
discussing later Eddington's renowned example of the relation between the table I see before 
me and the structured molecules of which it consists, Goodman remarks: "Is the seen table the 
same as the mess of molecules? To such questions, discussed at length in the philosophical 
literature, I suspect that the answer is a firm yes and no. The realist will resist the conclusion 
that there is no world; the idealist will resist the conclusion that all conflicting versions describe 
different worlds. As for me, I find these views equally delightful and equally deplorable - for 
after all, the difference between them is purely conventional!" (Ibid., page 119.) Unfortunately, 
as Goodman realizes in his more exact moments, his commitment to negation, and therewith 
conflicting truths, entails worlds that are logically incompatible and hence incapable of being 
identified. (Ibid., page 110). So near and yet so far! 
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We must remember, however, that Goodman was right in his most important claim: to 
construct is to reconstruct, whether in art, philosophy or science, and hence the arts 
must serve as models for reconstructing the world. How then must we train ourselves to 
learn to reconstruct worlds artistically? If, as Goodman insists, construction is 
reconstruction wherever it occurs, then learning to construct must be learning to 
reconstruct. But that, as Robin Collingwood insisted, is to learn to think historically. 
 
 
The Last Dogma of Empiricism 
 
Quine and Davidson attacked many of the dogmatic distinctions of empiricism, and did 
so effectively. They remained committed, however (as Goodman has been, in practice) 
to a last dogma of empiricism whose tenability they had unwittingly destroyed, namely 
the distinction between the study of an art, philosophy or science and the study of its 
history.  
 
In 1962 Thomas Kuhn pried open the minds of a number of philosophers to the 
importance of history by insisting that major changes occur in a science only when a 
novel paradigm emerges, attracting those young enough (or mentally spry enough) to 
learn it as their working language, thus enabling them to recast the world taxonomically 
in a fresh and fruitful way, while repelling those too old to understand it, neither group 
being capable of comprehending the language of the other. As the younger workers 
replace the older, the newer paradigm becomes dominant, having bypassed rather than 
refuted its predecessor.40 
 
Kuhn, having had the temerity to suggest that science advances in its most revolutionary 
periods without attending to the truth or falsity of its claims, was attacked savagely by 
both positivists and Popperians for subverting its objectivity and hence rationality.41 
                                                     
40 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962). Kuhn consistently reaffirmed the linguistic metaphor: "Proponents of different 
theories are, I have claimed, native speakers of different languages." See his "Objectivity, Value 
Judgment, and Theory Choice", in The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1977), page 320. 
41 J.N. Watkins, toeing the party line, accused Kuhn of reducing science and its 
revolutions to a "closed society, intermittently shaken by collective nervous breakdowns", a 
charge trumped by Imre Lakatos with his suggestion that Kuhn "vindicates, no doubt 
unintentionally, the basic political credo of contemporary religious maniacs ..."; " ... scientific 
revolution is irrational, a matter of mob psychology". See their respective essays "Against 
Normal Science" and "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" in 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974 [1970]), 
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Kuhn replied, with scholarly glee, that only someone blind to the history of science 
could pretend that the hypothetico-deductive model had ever applied to any significant 
part of it; and since science, rather than philosophy, is the paradigm of rationality we 
wish to understand, the reconstructive rather than critical method upon which scientists 
rely, akin to the reconstructive methods of historians and artists, is the rational 
paradigm upon which philosophy, too, should model itself. 
 
Had Kuhn himself been sufficiently acquainted with the history of philosophy, he would 
have recognized that he was re-enacting, albeit in different costume, the role that had 
immunized and isolated Collingwood from the plague of positivism a quarter-century 
before. Collingwood, writing between the world wars, had insisted that metaphysical 
enquiry, the core of philosophy, was a historical endeavour. The only coherent role for a 
metaphysician was to register the absolute presuppositions prevalent in some historical 
period, for apart from their historical context the presuppositions lacked sense. To learn 
to think constructively as a philosopher, Collingwood concluded, one must immerse 
oneself in the history of philosophy, exactly as a student of music, for example, has to 
learn to write like Bach, and then like Beethoven and then like Wagner, etc., to be able 
to command the tools of musical composition available in our era. To become 
competent with the tools available for reconstructing the philosophy of politics, for 
example, one must learn to identify oneself imaginatively with Plato, and then Hobbes 
and then Kant, etc., thinking as they thought about the 'state' to understand what each 
had meant by the word, for how they had thought by means of it was unique to their 
historical epochs, and thus irreducible.42 
 
Collingwood was dismissed without hearing by most philosophers as a dilettante 
perversely disrespectful of the objectivity of philosophy.43 Simply put, however, he was 
despised for rejecting the distinction between the contexts of discovery and 
justification, the last dogma of empiricism, as Kuhn was to reject it, and be rejected, 
after him. If, however, as Davidson has implied, we as philosophers must presume that 
every assertion we overhear is true, and, after Goodman, that the philosophical games 
                                                     
pages 25-37 and 91-196, the latter a revision of an essay previously published in 1968. The 
quotations are from page 26, and pages 93 and 178. 
42 See the reference in note 11 above but also Collingwood's An Autobiography (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1939) and The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), especially the 
Introduction and Part V ("Epilegomena"). Hereafter Collingwood, IH. 
43 Even the executor of Collingwood's literary estate, James Knox, resisted publishing 
many of his later writings on history and philosophy, thinking them, in company with many of 
his published books, so absurd as to be incapable of being rendered consistent "even with 
themselves", "marred by febrility and overweening confidence", explicable only as the result of 
a mind corrupted by encroaching illness. See Knox's Preface to Collingwood, IH, pages xviii, xix 
and xxi. 
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we play must be as reconstructive as every other art, and hence that we must learn to 
learn, even when pursuing the arts of science or philosophy, as artists have always 
learned to learn, then it follows that Collingwood and Kuhn were correct. The assertions 
that we overhear as philosophers and that, after Davidson, we must interpret as true, 
must encompass those made by the philosophers of the past. If we are to learn how to 
re-philosophize in our own era, we must learn to think as they thought, in their terms, 
exactly as other artists must learn from the history of their art how to reconstruct its 
worlds in our own. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The glory of philosophy in the 20th century has been, for me, the pragmatic reformation 
of the dogmas of empiricism, historically construed, and therewith the reaffirmation of 
Kant's program of reconstructive synthesis. Few philosophers, however, have dared to 
imagine how profoundly revisionary and hence wondrously absurd that reformation 
would become, for it reaches to the roots of logic itself, and few aspects of the world 
reaffirm the need for that reconstruction more profoundly than the mysterious 
identities that Louis Lumière assimilated in 1895 when establishing the art of 
filmmaking, and that, a century later, have focused the conclusions summarized here. 
